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1I. Introduction 
As the United States continues to react to the September 
11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the 
legal decisions regarding the trials of prisoners captured in 
Afghanistan while fighting against the U.S. armed forces remain 
unsettled.  In January 2002, the United States military began 
transporting these prisoners to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba.  Since January 2002, approximately 600 to 800 
detainees have been flown 8,000 miles from the U.S. base in 
Kandahar, Afghanistan to the U.S. base in Cuba.1
Because the detainees are held by the U.S. military on what 
is effectively U.S. territory, the U.S. government must decide, at 
some point in the future, whether to release the detainees or to
criminally charge them.  In order for the detainees to be criminally 
tried, the government must decide in which court system their 
trials will be held.  If the detainees are tried as ordinary criminal 
defendants in the U.S. court system, then their trials will likely be 
held in the Article III courts, i.e. in the U.S. federal court system.  
From the government’s perspective, however, the use of the 
military justice system to try the detainees may be more 
advantageous.  In particular, trials before military tribunals need 
not be open to the general public and may be conducted on an 
expedited basis, permitting the quick resolution of individual cases 
and avoiding disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence material, 
which would be made public in an ordinary criminal trial in an 
Article III court.  
This article explores whether it is permissible for an Article 
I court to try the accused detainees captured in Afghanistan and 
detained on a U.S. Naval Base in Cuba.  This article examines the 
constitutionality of the legal options available to the U.S. in the 
future trials of the detainees, assuming that all the detainees are 
members of either the Taliban or Al Qaeda regime.2  It analyzes 
1
 Josef Braml, Bully or Benefactor? Rule of Law or Dictates by Fear: a German 
Perspective on American Civil Liberties in the War Against Terrorism, 27 
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 115 (Summer/Fall 2003); Nauroz Shah, 25 More 
Wahabis Arrive at Guantanamo Bay Base, June 11, 2002, at shianews.com.
2
 This assumption is based on the facts surrounding this international armed 
conflict.  As will be discussed below, the Taliban was the official government of 
2the jurisdiction of the military justice system as well as the federal 
court system.  Although this article focuses on Article I courts-
martial and not Article II military tribunals, a similar analysis and 
policy considerations apply to military tribunals and commissions 
created by the President in exercise of his Article II powers as 
neither Article I or II tribunals are part of the independent federal 
judiciary mandated by Article III.
In section II, this article provides the necessary background 
information.  It discusses the U.S. occupation of the naval base at 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as well as the political history of 
Afghanistan that gave rise to both the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
Afghanistan.  Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that when the U.S. invaded 
Afghani territory, the armed forces fighting against the U.S. armed forces were 
those of the Taliban.  As will also be discussed below, the Al Qaeda fighters 
have long been a part of the fighting force in Afghanistan and were in a 
symbiotic relationship with the Taliban government.  Accordingly, it is also 
reasonable to conclude that the fighters were members of Al Qaeda.  In addition, 
both the Taliban and Al Qaeda have openly spoken out against the U.S. and 
have long had agendas opposed to the U.S.  Plus, Al Qaeda has claimed 
responsibility for numerous actions opposing the influence of the U.S.  To 
conclude that these organizations were the forces opposing the U.S. invasion is 
therefore reasonable.  See notes 23-59, infra, and accompanying text for a 
thorough discussion.  
Also, as will be discussed below, the U.S. military continues to question the 
detainees regarding the planned activities of Al Qaeda.  According to news 
reports and government releases, the interrogations have been successful in 
preventing Al Qaeda attacks around the world.  This too leads to the conclusion 
that many of the detainees are in fact members of Al Qaeda.  See Bryan 
Robinson, A Slow Process: Lies and Silence Hamper Intelligence-Gathering at 
Guantanamo Bay, Apr. 10, 2002, at abcnews.com.
While it is possible that some detainees could be members of the Northern 
Alliance in Afghanistan, this is unlikely as the Northern Alliance is now an ally 
of the U.S. and has been fighting alongside the U.S. since the beginning of this 
international armed conflict.  See Thom Shanker, A Nation Challenged: The 
Combat; U.S. Tells How Rescue Turned into Fatal Firefight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
6, 2002, at A1.  
While it is also possible that the detainees could be members of different “war 
lord” tribes of Afghanistan, this too is unlikely as the Taliban government was 
successful in achieving one of its primary goals: the suppression of these tribes.  
See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN 
CENTRAL ASIA (2001), for a thorough discussion.  See also notes 23-59, infra, 
and accompanying text.
3regimes.  It describes the organizational structure of both the 
Taliban and Al Qaeda regimes and reviews the U.S. government’s 
position regarding the trials of the detainees.  It also analyzes the 
status of the detainees as prisoners of war and combatants subject 
to a military tribunal under the Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (the “Geneva 
Convention”)3 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.4
In section III, the jurisdiction of Article I courts, 
specifically military courts, is discussed.  Section III also briefly 
examines the law of war.  Section IV discusses the establishment 
of Article III courts, both in the U.S. and abroad.  Section V 
examines the domestic sources of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the 
Article III courts.  It also discusses war crimes and terrorism.  
Section VI considers the geographical, practical, and political 
limitations on Article I and III courts, most of which are common 
to both court systems.
Section VII addresses the constitutional and practical 
concerns when utilizing Article I courts in place of Article III 
courts.  It reviews the policies underlying the constitutional 
requirement that the judicial power of the U.S. be confined to 
Article III courts and applies a balancing test, considering both 
constitutional and practical limitations.  This section also considers 
the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances.  
Lastly, section VIII provides a conclusion that hopefully ensures 
constitutional trials for the detainees as well as domestic and 
international approval.
3
 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 
12, 1949 [hereinafter the “Geneva Convention”], 6 U.S.T. 3316.
4
 Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter “UCMJ”], 10 U.S.C. § 802 et 
seq. (2002).
4II. The Historical Setting 
A. The United States in Cuba
At Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. has a naval base which, for 
all practical purposes, is American territory.5  The U.S. leases this 
base from Cuba and has done so since U.S. forces occupied Cuba 
in 1903.6  Regarding the leased areas of land and water that 
comprise the naval base, Cuba agreed that during the period of 
occupation, the U.S. would exercise “complete jurisdiction and 
control over and within said areas.”7  The U.S., in return, 
recognized “the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba 
over and above the leased areas.”8  “Ultimate,” meaning final or 
eventual, is the key word in this agreement.  It means that Cuban 
sovereignty is interrupted during the period of U.S. occupancy, 
since the U.S. exercises complete jurisdiction and control, but in 
case occupation is terminated, the area reverts to the ultimate 
sovereignty of Cuba.9
The agreement regarding the naval base was later 
confirmed by the Treaty of 1934 between the U.S. and Cuba, 
signed at Washington on May 29, 1934.10  This treaty gives the 
U.S. a perpetual lease on the naval base, capable of being voided 
only by U.S. abandonment of the area or by mutual agreement 
5
 1 THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, ch. 3, available at
www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2003).
6 Id.
7
 Lease of Coaling or Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 
418, reprinted in THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, app. D, available at
www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2003).
8 Id.
9 See id.
10
 Treaty of 1934, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 866, reprinted in THE 
HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, app. D, available at
www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2003).
5between the two countries.11  Pursuant to the Treaty of 1934, the 
U.S. has for approximately seventy years exercised the essential 
elements of sovereignty over the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo 
Bay, without actually owning it.  Unless the U.S. abandons the 
area or agrees to a modification of the terms of its occupancy, it 
can continue in the present status as long as it likes.  This territorial 
status means that the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay are 
effectively on U.S. soil.12
11 Id.
12
 Notwithstanding the history of the Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Judge 
Matz of the federal district court of California ruled that no federal court has 
jurisdiction to hear the cases against the detainees as they are on Cuban soil.  
Judge Matz pointed out that because the detainees were captured abroad and 
remain abroad, they must be denied access to the U.S. federal courts.  “They 
have not stepped foot on American soil,” Judge Matz said.  Barbara Whitaker, 
Judge Denies Qaeda Captives a Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at 
A13.  
The only other federal courts that have addressed the issue have held that 
Guantanamo Bay is not within the sovereign territory of the United States and is 
not the functional equivalent of U.S. sovereign territory.  In Cuban American 
Bar Assoc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 
515 U.S. 1142 and 516 U.S. 913 (1995), the Eleventh Circuit had to determine 
whether Cuban and Haitian migrants temporarily detained at the Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Base could assert rights under various U.S. statutes and the U.S. 
Constitution.  Id. at 1421.  Citing the language of the lease agreement, the Court 
of Appeals stated “the district court erred in concluding that Guantanamo Bay 
was a ‘United States territory.’  We disagree that control and jurisdiction is 
equivalent to sovereignty.”  Id. at 1425.  The Court of Appeals then went on to 
reject the argument that U.S. military bases which are leased abroad and remain 
under the sovereignty of foreign nations are “‘functionally equivalent’ to being 
... within the United States.”  Id. See also Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 
338, 342-43 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay 
rested with Cuba and therefore plaintiff’s tort claim was barred under the 
“foreign country” exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act).  
For the purposes of this article, I will adhere to the history of the Naval base and 
assume that it is U.S. territory because the above cases are distinguishable.  All 
the cases that the courts have heard regarding the status of Guantanamo Bay 
have dealt with the rights of persons merely present at the naval base.  The 
courts presume that there is no jurisdiction when persons outside the U.S. seek 
to assert rights that only persons within U.S. territory may assert.  The holdings 
in those cases follow that presumption.  The cases against the detainees is 
distinguishable because the detainees are not asserting rights under any U.S. 
6B. The Political History of Afghanistan
In 1973, Afghanistan became a republic and Sardar 
Mohammed Daud became president.13  In order to crush a nascent 
Islamic fundamentalist movement, Daud turned to the Soviet 
Union for additional aid to try and modernize the state structure of 
Afghanistan.14  From 1956 to 1978, the Soviet Union gave over 
US$1 billion in economic aid and US$1.25 billion in military aid 
to Afghanistan, as the Soviets welded the country into their sphere 
of influence at the height of the Cold War.15  During the same 
period, the U.S. gave Afghanistan US$533 million in total aid.16
Despite this aid, Daud failed to build institutions and a loose 
centrally-administered bureaucracy was laid over the existing 
society with little public representation.
Just five years later in 1978, Marxist sympathizers in the 
army, who had trained in the Soviet Union, overthrew Daud in a 
bloody military coup.17  Daud and his family were massacred.18
The communists, who were bitterly divided, began to fight among 
themselves and their lack of understanding of Afghanistan’s 
complex tribal society led to widespread rural revolts against 
them.19  Within a few short months Afghanistan was catapulted 
into the center of the intensified Cold War between the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union.20
statute but rather are being held accountable for their actions and are being held 
in U.S. military custody.
13 RASHID, supra note 2, at 12.
14 Id. at 12-13.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 13.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
7With U.S. support, the Afghanis became anti-Soviet troops 
in their fight to defeat outsiders who were trying to subdue them 
and replace their time-honored religion and society with an alien 
ideology and social system.21  Out of this conflict, which claimed 
1.5 million Afghan lives between 1978 and 1989, emerged a group 
of Islamic extremist Afghanis who called themselves Taliban, or 
students of Islam.22
C. The Taliban’s Political and Military Organization
The Taliban was a structured government established in 
1994, though that structure existed in theory only.23  In actuality, 
the Taliban’s political and military decision-making process was 
secretive, dictatorial, inaccessible, and highly centralized in Mullah 
Omar, 24 who was elevated to Amir-al-Mumineen, Leader of the 
Faithful, in 1996.25  The Taliban’s head decision-making body was 
the Supreme Shura,26 known as the Kandahar Shura because it was 
based in Kandahar, Afghanistan.27  Omar appointed all the original 
ten members from among his friends and colleagues.28  Two other 
Shuras reported to the Kandahar Shura:  the Kabul Shura and the 
military Shura.29
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 95-104.
24 Id. at 95. It is also unrepresentative of the people and funds its operations with 
illegal drug trade, id. at 98, 117-27, but those issues and others regarding the 
legitimacy of the government are beyond the scope of this article. 
25
 Scott Johnson & Evan Thomas, Mullah Omar Off the Record, NEWSWEEK, 
Jan. 21, 2002, at 26-28.  It is unclear who “elevated” Omar to this status: others 
within the Taliban or himself.
26
 “Shura” is an Arabic term meaning “Islamic council.”  RASHID, supra note 2, 
at 244.
27 Id. at 98.  
28 Id. 
29 Id.
8The Kabul Shura was designed to deal with the day-to-day 
problems of the government and the city.30  The Kandahar Shura, 
however, frequently revoked even minor decisions made by the 
Kabul Shura.31  Underneath the Kabul Shura, the Taliban had 
representatives such as the governor, mayor, police chiefs, and 
senior administrators in the cities of Kabul, Herat, and Mazar.32
Omar prohibited these representatives from acquiring any local 
power base and they had no real control or authority.33
The military Shura was a loose body that planned strategy 
and implemented tactical decisions for the armed forces, but had 
no decision-making powers.34  The head of the Taliban’s armed 
forces was Omar, even though he had no official position.35  Under 
Omar was the chief of general staff and then chiefs of staff for the 
army and air force.36  There were at least four army divisions and
one armored division.37  There were officers and commanders, but 
no clear military hierarchy.38  Omar constantly shifted unit 
commanders around, often once a month, so that no commander 
gained a power base in any one region.39  The Taliban armed 
forces enlisted both short-term fighters and professionally trained 
30 Id.  
31 Id.  For example, the Kandahar Shura has revoked simple decisions to grant 
journalists permission to travel and to allow new U.N. aid projects within 
Afghanistan.  Id.
32 Id. at 98-99.  
33 Id.  This is part of the above-referenced Taliban goal to suppress various 
“tribes” in Afghanistan.  See note 2, supra.
34 RASHID, supra note 2, at 99.
35 Id.  Full information regarding the Taliban military structure is unknown as it 
is a highly secretive regime.
36 RASHID, supra note 2, at 99.
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id.  Unfortunately for the Taliban, no commander gains much comprehensive 
experience either.  Id.  This too is part of the Taliban’s above-referenced tactic 
to prohibit the dominance of any “war lord” or “tribe.”  See note 2, supra.
9soldiers.40  Essentially, the Taliban’s governmental and military 
structures were only a shell within which Omar dictated.41
The Taliban regime was a mostly unopposed government 
within Afghanistan, by Afghanis and other nations, from 1996 to 
2001.42  Therefore, it is accurate to describe the Taliban as 
Afghanistan’s legitimate government in 2001 when the U.S. began 
its war against terrorism.43  Under international law, it is of no 
consequence that the U.S. and other nations did not recognize the 
Taliban as a legitimate government.44
D. The Structure of Al Qaeda 
Al Qaeda’s formation began in 1982 when the U.S. and 
British governments encouraged over 100,000 Muslim radicals, 
from forty-three Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and 
East Africa, Central Asia, and the Far East, to travel to Afghanistan 
to fight side-by-side against the Soviet Union.45  Among these 
thousands of recruits was a young Saudi student named Osama Bin 
Laden, who became head of the network in 1989 and gave it the 
name “Al Qaeda.”46  Al Qaeda, which is an Arabic word for 
“military base,”47 is a worldwide network with no clear structure 
40 RASHID, supra note 2, at 100.  Presumably, the Taliban are these 
professionally trained soldiers, drawn from the former anti-communist army.  I 
will assume, for the purposes of this article, that this presumption is correct. 
41 See id. at 102, 104.
42 Id. at 102-04.
43 See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Word for Word, the Geneva 
Conventions: Who Is a Prisoner of War? You Could Look It Up. Maybe., N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, sec. 4, p. 9, col. 1 (quoting Doug Cassell).
44
 Analysis of Article 4(A)(1) is the same as an analysis of Article 4(A)(3) of the 
Geneva Convention, which encompasses “[m]embers of regular armed forces 
who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the 
Detaining Power.”  
45 RASHID, supra note 2, at 128-30.
46 Id. at 131-32.
47 Id. at 132.
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and very little apparent hierarchy beyond its apex in Osama Bin 
Laden.48
According to Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a former aide to Bin 
Laden, Al Qaeda has a somewhat corporate structure.49  Beneath 
the “emir,” as Bin Laden is called, sits a council of about twelve 
advisers called the shura.50  The council included Bin Laden 
confederates such as Muhammad Atef, an Egyptian who served as 
military commander of Al Qaeda,51 and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who 
led Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group.52  It is unclear who 
sits on the council now as numerous Al Qaeda members have been 
killed or captured.  Within Al Qaeda, there are two types of 
operatives:  (1) a sophisticated group that takes care of the 
planning, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and bomb making; 
and (2) the expendable operatives that carry out the attacks.53
Al Qaeda’s central function is to train militant Islamic 
terrorists at its headquarter camps in Afghanistan.54  The Al Qaeda 
network appears to be comprised of numerous cells, from Bosnia 
48
 Michael Elliott, Hate Club, TIME, Nov. 12, 2001, at 58.  It is believed that 
Abu Zubaydah (a Saudi-born Palestinian) was Al Qaeda’s director of 
international operations.  Id.  Zubaydah was arrested in late March 2002 with the 
help of Pakistani authorities.  Deborah Charles, Zubaydah Arrest Helps Avert 
New Attack on U.S.- FBI, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2002.
49
 Benjamin Wiser & Tim Golden, A Nation Challenged: Bin Laden’s Network; 
Al Qaeda: Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of Terrorists-in-Waiting, N. Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 2001, at B4.
50 Id.  “Shura” is an Arabic term meaning “Islamic council.”  RASHID, supra 
note 2, at 244.
51 U.S. officials have said that Atef was killed in American air strikes on 
Afghanistan.  Charles Aldinger, Rumsfeld Slams ‘Hyper-Ventilation’ Over 
Captives, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2002.
52
 Wiser & Golden, supra note 49.
53 Id. (relating account of Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, a Jordanian convicted in 
Summer 2001 of helping plan the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi).
54
 Elliott, supra note 48. 
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to the Philippines to Uganda,55 controlled by Bin Laden.56  In 
addition to directing its own attacks, it acts as an umbrella group, 
financing the operations of its widely-flung cells and providing 
operatives in order to successfully carry out terrorist attacks 
against all “infidels,” a term that includes both non-Muslims and 
Muslims of “lesser” faith.57  It is unclear whether Bin Laden has 
been aware of the domestic agendas of all the cells at all times.58
What is clear is that Bin Laden had considerable influence with the 
Taliban and directly increased the Taliban’s hostility toward the 
U.S., its allies, and Muslim regimes around the world.59
E. President Bush’s Executive Order Regarding the Trial of 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees 
In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and 
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, President Bush began a “War 
Against Terrorism.”60  The U.S. sent troops into Afghanistan in 
November 2001 to fight and capture Taliban soldiers and Al Qaeda 
operatives.61  On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued the 
Military Order Regarding Detention, Treatment, and Trial of 
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (the “Military 
Order”).62  In the Military Order, President Bush stated that the 
55 Id.  While many of the original Al Qaeda members were from Afghanistan 
and other Arab nations, many of the new members were born and raised in the 
Muslim communities of Europe.  See id.
56 RASHID, supra note 2, at 136.  The Al Qaeda network follows Bin Laden’s 
fatwas (legal rulings issued by Islamic scholars) even though they carry no 
moral weight in the Muslim world as Bin Laden is neither an Islamic scholar nor 
a teacher and thus cannot legally issue fatwas.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 139.
60 See Jessica Wong, FAQ: Is the United States really “at war”?, CBC NEWS 
ONLINE, Sept. 2001, at www.cbc.ca/news.
61 See Thom Shanker, A Nation Challenged: The Combat; U.S. Tells How 
Rescue Turned into Fatal Firefight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A1.
62
 Military Order Regarding Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism [hereinafter “Military Order”], 66 Fed. 
12
U.S. intends to use military tribunals to try the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda detainees captured while fighting against U.S. armed forces 
in Afghanistan.63   The Military Order declares that the military 
tribunals convened to try the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees will 
resemble ordinary courts-martial in some ways, but not in all.64  As 
in an ordinary court-martial, a defendant will be given a military 
lawyer and also may hire a civilian attorney, and the panels will 
include three to seven officers.65  Conviction of any crimes will 
require a two-thirds majority of the panel,66 unlike the unanimity 
required for civilian trials.67
The tribunals, like courts-martial, will be able to consider 
any punishment permitted by the law of war, including death 
sentences,68 but any decision to impose such death sentence must 
be unanimous.69  If convicted, a defendant could ask a special 
review panel, consisting of three members, to re-evaluate the 
case.70  The defendant could not, however, appeal to any federal 
court.71  Notwithstanding the above limitations, the U.S. Supreme 
Court is allowed to review certain cases that a military court 
Reg. 57,833, § 1(e) (Nov. 13, 2001).  While the military tribunal created by 
President Bush is an Article II court, the same policy considerations and analysis 
attach whether the military tribunal is ultimately created by the President or 
Congress.  For the purposes of this article, the phrase “Taliban and Al Qaeda 
detainees” refers only to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.
63 Id.
64
 Military Order, supra note 62; Anne Gearan, Tribunals to be Like Courts-
Martial, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 20, 2002.  The Military Order creates an 
Article II tribunal rather than an Article I tribunal.  This distinction is irrelevant 
to the analysis.
65
 Gearan, supra note 64; UCMJ, supra note 4, § 816(2)(A).
66
 Military Order, supra note 62, § 4(c)(6).
67
 Gearan, supra note 64.  
68
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 818; Military Order, supra note 62, § 4(a).
69
 Gearan, supra note 64.
70 Id.  
71 Id.
13
decides.72  In addition, the Military Order does not attempt to 
foreclose habeas corpus.73  As always, the President has the power 
to grant pardons to any convicted individual.74
While defendants will have the right to see the evidence 
against them, admissibility of evidence is likely to be broader than 
in civilian trials and courts-martial.75  Prosecutors will be able to 
use evidence that has probative value to a reasonable person,76
which will likely include hearsay statements and documents that 
the prosecutors obtained through unorthodox means.77  For
example, maps and writings discovered in abandoned houses in 
Afghanistan that passed through several hands prior to U.S. 
investigators obtaining them will be admissible.78  Also, the 
tribunals will be “mostly open” to the press, unless classified 
material needs to be presented.79  Lastly, the military tribunals will 
try only non-U.S. citizens.80
72
 18 U.S.C. § 1259. 
73
 Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27.
74
 Military Order, supra note 62, § 7(2); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
75
 Gearan, supra note 64.  “Given the danger to the safety of the United States 
and the nature of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under 
this order, I find … that it is not practicable to apply in military [tribunals] under 
this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in 
the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.”  Military Order, 
supra note 62, § 1(f).
76
 Military Order, supra note 62, § 4(c)(3).
77
 Gearan, supra note 64.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80
 Military Order, supra note 62, § 2(a).  The American Bar Association issued a 
resolution urging that military tribunals only be used in limited circumstances 
and in accordance with fair trial standards.  In particular, it urged the 
administration not to use military panels against U.S. citizens or others who are 
in the U.S. lawfully.  James Podgers, ABA Tackles Tribunals Issue:  House 
Urges Military Panels Trying Terrorists to Operate within Certain Boundaries, 
ABA Journal E-Report, Feb. 8, 2002, at www.abanet.org/journal/ereport.  
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As evidenced by the Military Order, the Bush 
administration has concluded that both the Taliban and Al Qaeda 
regimes are military forces and thus all the detainees are within the 
jurisdiction of the military justice system, either as prisoners of 
war or combatants.  These conclusions, however, are not settled.  
In order to determine if the conclusions are accurate, it is necessary 
to apply the Geneva Convention to the members of those regimes.
F. Application of the Geneva Convention to the Detainees
The Geneva Convention applies because this is an 
international armed conflict81 between signatories,82 namely the 
U.S. and Afghanistan.83  Its provisions distinguish between armed 
forces of a party to the conflict and other armed forces.  Pursuant 
to the jurisdictional grant of the Geneva Convention, members of 
the enemy military and prisoners of war (“POWs”) may be tried by 
a court-martial “unless existing laws of the Detaining Power 
expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed 
forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offen[s]e 
alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.”84  The 
laws of the U.S. – the Detaining Power in the cases against the 
detainees – do not allow for trial of military matters in federal 
courts.85  In addition to members of the enemy  military and 
POWs, persons that have violated the laws of war, by fighting as 
unlawful combatants or otherwise, are subject to court-martial 
81
 Military Order supra note 62, § 1(a):  “International terrorists, including 
members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and 
military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the 
United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires 
the use of the United States Armed Forces.”
82
 Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 2 states “the present Convention shall 
apply to all cases of … armed conflict which may arise between two or more of 
the High Contracting Parties.”
83
 Other relevant signatories include Cuba, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Iraq, 
Israel, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, the 
United Kingdom, and Yemen.
84
 Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 84.
85 See UCMJ, supra note 4, § 821.
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jurisdiction.86  Lastly, when there is a “war,” persons who 
participate in an international armed conflict and accompany and 
serve with the armed forces of a country surrender their right to be 
tried in an Article III court and thus are subject to court-martial.87
The Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, as POWs or lawful 
combatants, or as unlawful combatants who have violated the laws 
of war,88 would be subject to U.S. military law and thus could be 
tried by a court-martial.89  While the detainees would enjoy 
extensive due process protections in the military justice system 
pursuant to both the Uniform Code of Military Justice90 and the 
Geneva Convention, their rights would not be coextensive with the 
protections civilians enjoy in Article III criminal trials.  For 
example, military tribunals are not required to offer all the 
procedural protections guaranteed in civilian courts by the 
Constitution in Article III, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments, as well as those articulated in various judicial 
86
 “[T]he law of war draws a distinction between … lawful and unlawful 
combatants.  Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as 
prisoners of war by opposing military forces.  Unlawful combatants are likewise 
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerence 
unlawful.”  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942).  See also note 88, infra.
87
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802.
88
 Because lawful combatants meet the four requirements enumerated in Article 
4(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention, they are POWs.  The converse is not 
necessarily true.  David B. Rivkin, Bringing Al-Qaeda to Justice: The 
Constitutionality of Trying Al-Qaeda Terrorists in the Military Justice System, 
paper published by The Heritage Foundation, Nov. 5, 2001, available at 
www.heritage.org/library/legalmemo/lm3.html.  Unlawful combatants, on the 
other hand, are those who take up arms but who fail to do so in a manner 
consistent with the four requirements of Article 4(A)(2) of the Geneva 
Convention.  Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Under International Law, 
transcript of briefing at The Federalist Society, Feb. 27, 2002, at www.fed-
soc.org/Publications/Transcripts.
89
 Persons subject to this chapter include prisoners of war in custody of the 
armed forces and, in time of war, persons serving with or accompanying an 
armed force in the field. UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802.  Each armed force has 
jurisdiction over all persons subject to this chapter.  UCMJ, supra note 4, § 
817(a).
90
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 801 et seq.
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decisions interpreting those constitutional provisions.  Due to the 
diminished procedural protections they are afforded, and their 
arguably non-military status, the detainees will likely object to the 
jurisdiction of the military justice system and argue that they are 
entitled to trial in a non-military court with exactly the same 
protections as other civilians.
1. Taliban Detainees 
Because the Taliban was the official government of 
Afghanistan and because the Taliban fighters are members of that 
official government’s armed forces,91 the captured Taliban soldiers 
appear to be “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict” under the Geneva Convention Article 4(A)(1) and thus 
are POWs.92  As POWs, they are subject to trial by a military court 
pursuant to both the Geneva Convention and the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice.  A senior U.S. administration official, however, 
asserts that regardless of whether the Taliban is an armed force or a 
militia, it must also meet the requirements set out in Article 
4(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention in order for its members to be 
deemed POWs.93  Article 4(A)(2) states that POWs are persons 
belonging to:
(2)  Members of other militias … belonging to a Party to 
the conflict … providing that such militias … fulfill the 
following conditions:
(a)  that of being commanded by a person responsible 
for his subordinates;
(b)  that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable 
at a distance;
(c)  that of carrying arms openly;
91 See notes 23-44, supra, and accompanying text.
92
 Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(A):  “Prisoners of war … are persons 
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of 
the enemy:
(1)  Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as 
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.” 
93
 Shanker & Seelye, supra note 43.  
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(d)  that of conducting their operations in accordance 
with the laws and customs of war.
To support its argument that the Taliban must meet the same four 
criteria to receive POW status – notwithstanding whether they are 
categorized as the official army or as a militia – the U.S. 
administration cites official commentary on Article 4 of the 
Geneva Convention: “‘regular armed forces’ have all the material 
characteristics and all the attributes of armed forces in the sense of 
sub-paragraph (1)….  The delegates to the 1949 Diplomatic 
Conference were therefore fully justified in considering that there 
was no need to specify for such armed forces the requirements 
stated in sub-paragraph (2).”94  Accordingly, the U.S. 
administration argues that any official army inherently has the four 
attributes required by Article 4(A)(2) and that because the Taliban 
regime does not possess these four attributes, it cannot be the 
official army of Afghanistan.
This conclusion, however, is disputed.95  Commentators 
and foreign governments have both argued to the contrary.  For 
example, some scholars interpret the Geneva Convention to mean 
that if a person is a member of the armed forces or of the de facto 
government of a country, then that person is a POW 
notwithstanding the four requirements enumerated in Article 
(4)(A)(2).96  Additionally, The Netherlands, Britain, Germany, 
94 Id.
95
 The International Committee of the Red Cross, in particular, disagreed with 
the U.S. position.  In a rare press release, it stated that “international 
humanitarian law foresees that members of the Armed Forces, as well as militias 
associated to them, … are protected by the … Geneva Convention.”  Treatment 
of Al Qaeda and Taliban Under International Law, transcript of briefing at The 
Federalist Society, Feb. 27, 2002, at www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Transcripts.  
The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva is viewed as the 
custodian of the Geneva Convention. Id.
96 Id.  Doug Cassell, director of the center for international human rights at 
Northwestern University School of Law, further argues that the four 
requirements apply only to certain kinds of nongovernmental armed forces.  Id.  
Erwin Chemerinsky, a law professor at the University of Southern California, 
agrees that the detainees are POWs.  Red Cross Objects to Camp Photos; A 
Federal Judge Will Hear Challenges to the Treatment of Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 2002, at A6.
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France, and the International Committee of the Red Cross have 
openly demanded that the detainees be recognized as POWs 
because they are members of the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda regimes, 
both of which are military forces, and were captured during armed 
combat.97  British newspapers even attacked the treatment of the 
detainees as “barbaric,” noting that President Bush was close to 
losing the support and sympathy of the entire “civilized world.”98
The U.S. responded that the international reaction was “hyper-
ventilation” and defended its position that the detainees are not 
POWs.99  Nonetheless, under domestic and international political 
pressure,100 the U.S. backed away from its position and, while it 
has not agreed that the Taliban detainees are POWs, it has agreed 
to apply the Geneva Convention to them and afford them all the 
protections due to POWs.101  Consequently, it is still unclear 
whether the Taliban detainees are POWs, lawful combatants, or 
unlawful combatants subject to courts-martial jurisdiction.
2. Al Qaeda Detainees 
There is agreement that the Al Qaeda operatives are not 
members of the armed forces of a party to this conflict.  
Notwithstanding that the Taliban harbored Bin Laden and 
supported the terrorist activities of Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda was not the 
official army of the Taliban regime as the Taliban had its own 
army. 102  But the question remains whether the Al Qaeda detainees 
97 Id.  See also Aldinger, supra note 51.
98 World Asks: Detainee or POW?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, sec. 
National.
99
 Aldinger, supra note 51.
100
 For example, the French and British governments stated that they would have 
difficulty transferring any future detainees if the Geneva Convention did not 
apply.  The Justice Department, the White House counsel, and Secretary of State 
Colin L. Powell all advised Mr. Bush to apply the Geneva Convention.  Thom 
Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse 
Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.
101
 Shanker & Seelye, supra note 100; Deborah Orin, Bush: Captured Terror 
Fighters Are Not POWs, N.Y. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at 12.
102 RASHID, supra note 2, at 133-40.
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qualify as POWs subject to trial by a military court.  The answer 
depends in part on whether they fall within Article 4(A)(2) of the 
Geneva Convention.  In order to do so, they must meet the four 
criteria previously mentioned for militia and volunteer corps.103
U.S. officials argue that they do not meet any of the four 
criteria.  First, it is unclear who commands them.  For example, 
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, an Al Qaeda operative, attended a 
remote camp in Afghanistan in 1995 and was sent back home to 
Tanzania to patiently wait for his call, which he received three 
years later to help bomb the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania.104  When 
Mohamed was captured in 1999, he told the F.B.I. that he was not 
really sure what Al Qaeda was and that he learned only through 
news reports who had sponsored his bombing.105  He said he had 
never met Bin Laden and did not even know what he looked 
like.106  Of course, this may be false.  Whether the Al Qaeda 
detainees fall within the Geneva Convention’s definition of POW 
will depend on all the known information, most of which has come 
from prior and/or convicted cooperating Al Qaeda operatives.  
Testimony regarding the lack of knowledge of command structure 
will be influential in any inquiry.  
Second, Al Qaeda has no distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance nor do its operatives carry their arms openly.  The Islamic 
103
 Prisoners of war … are persons belonging to one of the following categories, 
who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(2)  Members of other militias … belonging to a Party to the conflict … 
providing that such militias … fulfill the following conditions:
(a)  that of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates;
(b)  that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance;
(c)  that of carrying arms openly;
(d)  that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws 
and customs of war.
Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(2).
104
 Wiser & Golden, supra note 49.
105 Id.
106 Id.
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ideology Takfir wal Hijra – a kind of Islamic fascism – is believed 
to be the dominant influence on Al Qaeda.107  The Takfir 
encourage violence against both non-Muslims and Muslims who 
contradict Islam.108  The goal of the Takfir is to create undetectable
soldiers who blend into “corrupt” societies in order to plot better 
attacks.109  As a result, to have a distinctive sign and carry arms 
openly would be contrary to Al Qaeda’s goals.
Lastly, Al Qaeda does not follow the laws and customs of 
war.  There are several examples that provide sufficient evidence.  
On February 23, 1998, all the groups associated with Al Qaeda 
issued a fatwa110 instructing that “to kill the Americans and their 
allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every 
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible.”111
Then in November 1998, Bin Laden stated that “[h]ostility towards 
America is a religious duty” and that it was his personal Islamic 
duty to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons to use against the 
U.S.112  Both of these international declarations of intent are 
contrary to the laws and customs of war.  Parties to a conflict are 
required to always aim at the restoration of peace.113  Al Qaeda has 
a stated intent – indeed, a religious duty – to perpetuate war, not 
peace.  
Also, civilian persons and objects may not be attacked 
under the laws of war.114  Clearly, the attack on the non-military 
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, which killed 2,837 
107
 Elliott, supra note 48.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110
 A fatwa is a legal ruling issued by Islamic scholars.  RASHID, supra note 2, at 
243-44.
111 Id. at 134.
112 Id. at 135.
113 FREDERIC DE MULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED 
FORCES 38 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 1987).
114 Id. at 48.
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civilians,115 and the explicit Al Qaeda declaration to murder 
civilians, are both contrary to the laws of war.116  Furthermore, the 
customary humanitarian law of armed conflict opposes the use of 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.117  In addition, the laws 
of war forbid the execution of prisoners on the battlefield.118
When Al Qaeda fighters captured a U.S. soldier who had fallen out 
of a helicopter in Afghanistan and killed him on the battlefield, this 
was unmistakably outside the laws of war. 119  Under the Geneva 
Convention, that U.S. soldier should have been given POW 
status.120
There are many other aspects of Al Qaeda operations that 
demonstrate that Al Qaeda does not adhere to the laws of war and 
thus does not fall within the Geneva Convention’s POW definition.  
It is still unclear, however, whether the Al Qaeda detainees are 
lawful or unlawful combatants subject to courts-martial 
jurisdiction.
115
 At the World Trade Center, 2,837 dead or missing.  At the Pentagon, 184 
dead or missing.  In Pennsylvania, 40 dead on hijacked plane.  Dead and 
Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.
116 MULINEN, supra note 113, at 43, 45, and 48. 
117 See FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 159-60 (Int’l 
Comm. of the Red Cross 1987).
118 Id.
119
 Thom Shanker, A Nation Challenged: The Combat; U.S. Tells How Rescue 
Turned into Fatal Firefight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A1.
120
 It may be argued that because Al Qaeda operatives do not meet the first three 
requirements, there is no need for them to follow the laws of war, as they will 
not be deemed POWs or fall within the Geneva Convention even if they do 
follow the laws of war.  Furthermore, the U.S. has already stated that it will not 
grant POW status to Al Qaeda operatives.  However, these arguable facts do not 
change the analysis of whether Al Qaeda follows the laws of war.  While Al 
Qaeda operatives clearly have no incentive to apply the Geneva Convention as it 
will not be applied to them, there is a reciprocity argument wherein if Al Qaeda, 
or the international community, want the Geneva Convention to apply to Al 
Qaeda operatives, then Al Qaeda must follow the laws of war and the Geneva
Convention.
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III. The Creation of Article I Courts Pursuant to the U.S. 
Constitution
Congress has created tribunals pursuant to its Article I 
powers in three narrow situations: territorial courts, military courts, 
and courts or agencies that adjudicate “public rights” cases.121  In 
these three areas, there are exceptional circumstances that allow 
Congress, consistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation 
of powers, to establish federal courts that lack Article III 
protections.122  This article deals only with the second exception: 
military courts.  
Acting pursuant to its power to regulate armed forces, 
Congress has created a system of federal military courts developed 
outside Article III.123  These courts do not have the constitutional 
protections of the Article III courts in that the judges do not have 
life tenure or salary protections.  Further, the Constitution does not 
require that military courts, commonly known as courts-martial, 
provide grand jury indictment, trial by jury, and in some cases, the 
right to counsel.124  A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of the 
defendant’s peers who must decide unanimously, but by a panel of 
121 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-67 (1982) (plurality opinion).
122
 Generally, the exceptions also apply to Article II courts.  However, the 
President, unlike the Congress, also has the power to act pursuant to his 
constitutional power as Commander in Chief.  “The President shall be 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.”  U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1.  Also, the President has foreign relations power that the 
Congress does not.  The executive branch powers are beyond the scope of this 
article.  For a thorough discussion on the President’s power to establish Article 
II tribunals, see Maryellen Fullerton, Hijacking Trials Overseas: the Need for an
Article III Court, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (Fall 1986).
123
 “The Congress shall have power to … make rules for the government and 
regulations of the land and naval forces.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.  See 
also Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 686 (1973); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 
(1950); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.
124
 Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1961). See also Wright v. 
Markley, 351 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Willingham, 217 F. Supp. 
901 (D. Pa. 1962), affirmed 318 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1962).
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officers empowered to act by a two-thirds vote.125  The presiding 
officer at a court-martial is not a judge but is a military law 
officer.126  Because the courts-martial lack these constitutional 
protections, they may only hear criminal matters that fall within 
the narrow exception of “military crimes.”127
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional protections, 
courts-martial are justified because the military must have 
authority to adjudicate matters in order to maintain an efficient, 
well-disciplined fighting force.128  The rationale for criminal trials 
in courts-martial is that quick adjudication is necessary to enforce 
discipline among American soldiers, wherever they may be.129
Thus jurisdiction over American soldiers is based solely upon the 
status of the accused.  On the other hand, when members of 
another nation’s military forces are tried in American military 
courts, the nature of the offense and the existence of war or 
imminent threat of war, in addition to the status of the accused, are 
significant factors.130
Congress has enacted statutory provisions, the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), that set forth both the 
procedural and substantive law applicable to military courts.131
125
 O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1969); see also Fullerton, supra 
note 122, at 21.
126 O’Callahan, 395 U.S. 263-64.
127 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70.
128
 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957).
129
 Solorio v. United States, 482 U.S. 435 (1987).  This rationale might lead to 
the conclusion that members of the enemy military cannot be tried by courts-
martial.  This, however, is not true.  Efficient discipline of all persons associated 
with the military also provides for a well-disciplined fighting force.  See Ex 
parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
130 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
131
 UCMJ, supra note 4.  The sources of military jurisdiction include the 
Constitution and international law, which includes the law of war.  MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES [hereinafter “MCM”] Preamble I-1 (2000 
ed.).
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The UCMJ defines those persons subject to its provisions.132  The 
UCMJ then provides that the jurisdiction of courts-martial 
generally depends on the accused’s status as a person subject to the 
UCMJ,133 rather than on the nature of the offense charged or the 
place where the offense occurred.  Consequently, there are no 
geographical limitations on the military justice system.  Rather, the 
UCMJ applies in all places where persons subject to the UCMJ are 
located,134 and is not restricted territorially to the limits of a 
particular State.135  Thus the UCMJ application is clearly 
extraterritorial.  Courts-martial have power to try any offense 
under the UCMJ, including a violation of the law of war, so long 
as that exercise of jurisdiction is over a person subject to the 
UCMJ.136  There are multiple categories of persons subject to the 
UCMJ,137 but only two groups are relevant to this article:  
(1) POWs in custody of the U.S. armed forces138 and (2) persons 
who violate the law of war. 139  Persons who violate the law of war 
are considered unlawful combatants and are thus outside the 
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury and subject to courts-
martial jurisdiction. 140
132
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802.
133
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 817(a).
134
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 805; MCM, supra note 131, Rule 201
135 Gosa, 413 U.S. at 686.  See also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 165; Whelchel, 340 
U.S. at 127; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.  See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) 
(offenses clause of Constitution empowers Congress to create courts to 
prosecute war crimes and violations of the laws of war occurring outside the 
U.S. territory).
136
 MCM, supra note 131, Rule 203, discussion (a).  
137 See UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802(a)(1) – (12) for the twelve categories of 
persons subject to military court jurisdiction.
138
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802.  Many other persons are subject to the UCMJ; 
however, this article only addresses the categories of persons relevant to the 
analysis of whether the detainees are subject to courts-martial jurisdiction.
139
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 818.  Nothing in the UCMJ limits the power of 
courts-martial to try persons under the law of war.  MCM, supra note 131, Rules 
202(b) and 203.  
140 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38, 44.
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Military courts have jurisdiction over persons who violate 
the laws of war by, inter alia, aligning themselves with enemy 
military forces for the purpose of committing hostile acts or by 
committing war crimes.141  Jurisdiction extends to war crimes 
committed by members of the U.S. military;142 by persons, 
including civilians, “in an area of actual fighting”143 or in occupied 
enemy territory;144 by enemy belligerents, whether military145 or 
civilian,146 even if they are U.S. citizens;147 and by citizens of third 
141
 “War crimes” are principally defined by international law.  See notes 195-
202, infra, and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of what 
constitutes a war crime.
142
 Under the UCMJ, general courts-martial “have jurisdiction to try any person 
who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal.”  UCMJ, supra 
note 4, § 818. The MCM, supra note 131, § 201(f)(1)(B) (i) is more precise: 
“General courts-martial may try any person who by the law of war is subject to 
trial by military tribunal for any crime against … [t]he law of war ... .”  See also 
MCM, supra note 131, at § 202(b) (“Nothing in this rule limits the power of 
general courts-martial to try persons under the law of war”).  This jurisdiction of 
courts-martial does not deprive military commissions and other military 
tribunals of “concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by 
statute or by the law of war may be tried” by them.  UCMJ, supra note 4, § 821.
143 Reid, 354 U.S. at 33.
144 See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (affirming conviction in 1950 
of an air force officer’s wife, by a U.S. occupation court in the nature of a 
military commission, for murder in violation of the German criminal code, 
committed in the American Zone of Germany); see also Reid, 354 U.S. at 33 
n.60.  “The authority for such commissions does not necessarily expire upon 
cessation of hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty of peace.  It may 
continue long enough to permit the occupying power to discharge its 
responsibilities fully.”  Madsen, 343 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted).
145 See, e.g., Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (post-war trial by military 
commission of former Japanese commander in the Philippines).
146 See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (trial of civilian German military 
spies in wartime by U.S. military commission).  For the history of U.S. military 
commissions, which were originally established to try civilians for war crimes,
see id. at 26-31, and Madsen, 343 U.S. at 346-55.
147
 One of the civilians accused in Quirin claimed to be a U.S. citizen, although 
this was disputed by the government.  The Court ruled that citizen or not, if he 
was an enemy belligerent, he could be tried by military commission.  See 
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20, 37-38.
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countries not at war with the U.S., for “grave breaches” of the 
Geneva Conventions.148
In addition, when a state of war, a military occupation, or 
some other significant military reason exists, military tribunals 
may try persons serving with or accompanying an armed force149
and civilians150 for non-military crimes.  Oftentimes, these military 
tribunals or commissions are functionally distinct from the courts-
martial and are created by the Executive with express or tacit 
congressional authorization.151  These military commissions are 
148
 Soldiers or nationals of third party states who commit “grave breaches” of the 
Geneva Conventions in international conflicts are subject to universal 
jurisdiction under international law.  See generally Theodor Meron, 
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554, 
572-74 (1995).
149
 UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802.  Every person connected with the military is 
amenable to the jurisdiction of courts-martial while serving in a position that 
supports the military.  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
150 See e.g. Reid, 354 U.S. at 35; Madsen, 343 U.S. at 356-60; Milligan, 71 U.S. 
2 (1866).  However, military courts may not adjudicate criminal charges against 
civilians based on the threat of armed conflict with a potential military enemy,
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127, or during peacetime, Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 
234, 249 (1960).  This extension of military justice jurisdiction is limited by the 
availability of Article III courts to hear a particular case.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has held that civilians may not be tried by courts-martial when an Article 
III court is available.  McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Kinsella 
v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert,  354 U.S. 1 (1957); Ex 
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1867).  This limitation, however, does not necessarily 
apply in times of war.  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.  The Supreme Court has also 
limited the jurisdiction of courts-martial to service personnel only while in 
service.  Accordingly, courts-martial cannot try former service personnel even if 
the crime was committed while in the service.  United States ex rel. Toth v. 
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).  This limitation is beyond the scope of this article.    
151 RICHARD FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. METZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, Note on 
Military Tribunals or Commissions, in HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 46 (4th ed. Supp. 2002).  While tribunals 
and commissions created by the executive are Article II courts, the same 
analysis and policy considerations apply to courts created pursuant to Articles I 
and II.  This article will not discuss Article II tribunals as they have been used 
mostly abroad, in connection with military occupations of foreign territory, 
which is not presently the case in the trial of the detainees.  For a full discussion 
of Article II tribunals and commissions, see Fullerton, supra note 122.
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usually convened during wartime, and have, in some instances 
continued to try cases after hostilities ended.152
Like courts-martial, Article II military tribunals and 
commissions, which are created by the executive, lack 
geographical limitations.  Both Article I and Article II military 
courts have been established abroad.153  Pursuant to the President’s 
war power, there were military tribunals in Germany established 
by the American occupying forces in 1945.154  These 
extraterritorial tribunals were justified because Germany was 
occupied by American forces at the time.155  While the tribunals 
applied local law, they supplanted the foreign court systems and 
tried all criminal cases against military and non-military persons, 
regardless of whether the crimes were military-related or not.156
Similarly, yet in a more unusual setting, the U.S. Court for Berlin 
was convened in Germany in 1978 pursuant to the President’s 
foreign relations power.  It tried and convicted Detlef Tiede, an 
East German citizen, for air piracy in hijacking a Polish airliner 
that was diverted to the U.S. Air Base in West Berlin.  It was an 
executive branch military commission created pursuant to the 
152 Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348, 360.  Military officers, appointed by the President, 
generally serve as judges of these commissions.  Id.  They serve for the terms set 
forth in the appointment and do not receive a guarantee of life tenure or 
protection against reduction in their salaries.  Quarles, 350 U.S. at 17.
153
 In addition to overseas military tribunals, there have been overseas 
diplomatic courts called consular courts.  Consular courts, which exercised 
criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens, were at one time provided for in treaties 
with Japan, Borneo, Madagascar, the Samoan Islands, Korea, the Tonga Islands, 
Tripoli, Persia, the Congo, Ethiopia, Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Muscat.  
Reid, 354 U.S. at 61-62 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Fullerton, supra 
note 122, at 58-60.  They were presided over by diplomatic personnel that serve 
at the will of the President and heard criminal cases.
154 See Fullerton, supra note 122, at 20-29.  These courts were in effect until 
1953 and tried over 600,000 cases.  See id. at 25.
155
 When a territory is occupied by American Armed Forces, the President has 
the responsibility to govern that territory.  Madsen, 343 U.S. at 346-48.
156 See e.g. Madsen, 343 U.S. at 356, 361-62 (homicide conviction of an 
American civilian tried in Germany by an American occupation court).  Madsen 
was incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in West Virginia.
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president’s Article II powers.157  It was staffed by an Article III 
judge, sitting temporarily in West Berlin, and conducted as an 
Article III court, including a jury of German citizens.158
Thus the historical record shows that both Article I and II 
military tribunals may constitutionally be established overseas.  
Accordingly, if the detainees may be tried by a military tribunal, 
that tribunal can be set up anywhere in the world.  Assuming that 
the Taliban detainees are deemed members of the official army of 
Afghanistan, they are subject to courts-martial jurisdiction.  
Assuming that Al Qaeda detainees are not deemed such members, 
additional jurisdiction issues arise regarding Al Qaeda because the 
use of military tribunals to try non-military personnel is rare and 
has been used in only very limited circumstances during U.S. 
history.159  Nonetheless, as history proves, military tribunals may 
try both military and non-military personnel, including civilians.  
This extension of military justice jurisdiction is limited, however, 
by the availability of Article III courts to hear a particular case.  
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that civilians may not be tried by 
courts-martial when an Article III court is available.160  Therefore, 
the Al Qaeda detainees may be tried in the military justice system 
even if they are civilians if at least one of two circumstances is 
present:  there is currently a “war” or there is no Article III court 
available to try them.
157
 The justification for this overseas non-Article III court is questionable as 
there was no real military occupation of Berlin at the time and the German court 
system was functional.  See Fullerton, supra note 122, for a thorough discussion.
158
 This procedure was questionable as German citizens are not entitled to a jury 
trial under German law.  Such a requirement also ignores that jurors for federal 
trial courts must speak English and be U.S. citizens, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865, 1869(f).  
Fullerton, supra note 122, at 11 n. 29.
159
 Rivkin, supra note 88. The only direct and definitive authority permitting 
such trials remains the Supreme Court’s decision in Quirin, which involved a 
formally declared war, a fact noted by the Court in its ruling.  Id.
160
 McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Kinsella v. United States, 
361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert,  354 U.S. 1 (1957); Ex parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. 2 (1867).  
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IV. The Creation of Article III Courts Pursuant to the U.S. 
Constitution
Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, the judges sitting 
in Article III courts have life tenure, assuming good behavior, and 
salaries that cannot be decreased during their terms in office.161
This provides political insulation so that judges can uphold the 
constitution and law without regard for the popularity of their 
decisions.162  Article III courts are meant to provide protection 
from majoritarian policies that might be unfair to litigants.163
Article III courts derive their jurisdictional powers from the 
Constitution and federal statutes.  Because Congress has the power 
to create the lower federal courts, i.e. the district and circuit courts, 
Congress has the power to define their jurisdiction.164  Similarly, 
pursuant to the exceptions clause, Congress can limit and define 
the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.165  As the 
U.S. Constitution and applicable statutes stand at present, the 
criminal cases against the detainees must be heard in U.S. district 
courts as the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal only have 
appellate jurisdiction over the cases.166
The Constitution provides that the judicial power shall 
extend to all cases arising under the “Constitution, the laws of the 
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
161 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
162 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 4 (3d ed. 1999).
163 See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58.
164
 “The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  There is disagreement as to how much 
Congress can limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.  However, that 
discussion is beyond the scope of this article.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 169-191 (3d ed. 1999), for a thorough discussion.
165
 “In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate 
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such 
regulations as the Congress shall make.”  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
166 See U.S. CONST. art. III; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1251 and 1291.
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their authority.”167  The constitution limits the federal judicial 
branch to the exercise of its power in cases or controversies that 
fall within nine enumerated categories.168  Article III contains no 
geographical limitations.  As long as the federal court exercises its 
power within these nine categories and is staffed by judges 
according to the Article III judicial safeguards of independence, 
Congress may establish an Article III court outside the U.S.169
V. Statutory Authorization Providing Extraterritorial 
Adjudication in Article III Courts
In addition to the abovementioned limitations on Article III 
courts, the statutory grants of criminal jurisdiction to Article III 
courts over crimes occurring beyond American borders further 
limit the reach of the courts.  Congress defines and limits the 
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts through duly enacted 
statutes.  Congress can enact laws applicable beyond the territorial 
boundaries of the U.S.,170 but there is a long-standing presumption 
that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is 
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.171
There are at least seven federal statutes giving the federal courts 
167 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
168
 “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their Authority; —to all Cases affecting 
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; —to all Cases of admiralty 
and maritime Jurisdiction; —to Controversies to which the United States shall 
be a Party; —to Controversies between two or more States; —between a State 
and Citizens of another State [changed by the Eleventh Amendment]; —between 
Citizens of different States; —between Citizens of the same State claiming 
Lands under Grants of different States; and between a State, or the Citizens 
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects [changed by the Eleventh 
Amendment].”  U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
169
 Fullerton, supra note 122, at 19 n. 57.
170 See e.g. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-61 (1991) 
(parties concede that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the 
territory of the U.S.).
171 Id. at 248.  In order to ensure extraterritorial jurisdiction, Congress utilizes 
either explicit or implicit language to provide extraterritorial application of 
federal laws.  
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jurisdiction to hear the criminal cases against the detainees.172
However, because only four of them apply extraterritorially, only 
these four statutes can potentially be used to prosecute the 
detainees who committed crimes overseas.173  These statutes base 
jurisdiction on the passive personality principle, which depends on 
the victim’s nationality, 174 and the universal theory, which 
172
 The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-03 (1987); the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1990) (formerly the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2331); the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333 (1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (1996); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B (1996); the War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).
173
 This discussion is somewhat limited as it can be based only on publicly 
available information regarding the detainees.  Presumably, there is much more 
information regarding the status of the detainees and the actions they have 
committed that allegedly constitute crimes.  However, much of this information 
is classified and available only to the U.S. government.  Therefore, the 
discussion of potential criminal charges against the detainees will be somewhat 
brief.
174 See the Draft Convention on Research in International Law of the Harvard 
Law School [hereinafter “Harvard Draft”], Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 
29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 467 (Supp. 1935).
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depends on the nature of the offense,175 rather than concepts of 
nationality (of the perpetrator) or territoriality.176
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990177 provides that 
“[w]hoever kills a national of the United States, while such 
national is outside the United States,” shall be subject to 
prosecution under the Act.178  The Act further allows for the 
prosecution of any person who attempts or conspires to kill a 
national of the U.S.179  The Act also provides for the prosecution of 
any person “outside the U.S.” who engages in physical violence 
“(1) with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the 
175
 Section 404 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. declares 
that any State has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for offenses of 
“universal concern,” such as piracy, hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, 
and “perhaps certain acts of terrorism,” regardless of where the acts are 
perpetrated.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 404 (1987).  The federal courts have exercised this “universal 
approach” to jurisdiction in numerous cases, see e.g. United States v Rezaq, 899 
F. Supp. 697 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (the legislative history of the Anti-hijacking Act 
provides a strong indication that Congress intended to provide extended criminal 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (exercise of jurisdiction under universality principle is proper, 
especially when such jurisdiction is bolstered by fact that two victims of the act 
were U.S. nationals); United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996); United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (crimes 
committed aboard aircraft are considered by both the U.S. and the international 
community to be offenses against the law of a nations).  While all these cases 
dealt with aircraft hi-jacking, they are relevant in that the court construed the 
applicable statutes as applying extraterritorially because the crimes were 
offenses against the law of nations.  
176 See Harvard Draft, supra note 174.
177
 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1990) (formerly the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 18 
U.S.C. § 2331 (1986)).
178
 18 U.S.C. § 2332(a).
179
 18 U.S.C. § 2332(b).  See Yousef, 927 F. Supp. at 680.  The federal district 
court held in Yousef that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332 and 371, which together proscribe 
conspiracy to kill U.S. citizens abroad, applies extraterritorially.  The defendants 
relied on the constitution and international law to challenge the jurisdiction over 
them for acts that did not occur on U.S. soil, did not involve U.S. citizens as 
defendants, and did not result in death or injury to a U.S. citizen.  
Notwithstanding these challenges, the court held that the statues were intended 
to apply extraterritorially.
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United States; or (2) with the result that serious bodily injury is 
caused to a national of the United States.”180  The Act applies 
extraterritorially to foreign nationals181 and gives the federal 
district courts exclusive jurisdiction.182  Any Taliban or Al Qaeda 
detainee who participated in the international armed conflict may 
be subject to prosecution under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990183
as the armed combat involved killing and attempted killing of U.S. 
soldiers and was certainly intended to cause serious bodily injury 
to those U.S. soldiers.  Because the detainees were all captured 
during armed combat, it is rational to infer that they were all 
participating in the international armed conflict.184
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b explicitly allows for 
extraterritorial application and prosecution for any person who, 
“involving conduct transcending national boundaries, … kills, 
kidnaps, maims, … or assaults” a member of the U.S. armed 
forces.185   Section 2332b also provides for the prosecution of 
attempts and conspiracies to commit such actions as well.  Because 
Al Qaeda has engaged in such transnational acts by carrying out 
terrorist attacks, including bombings, murder, and airplane 
180
 18 U.S.C. § 2332(c).
181 See United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).  
182
 18 U.S.C. § 2338 (2000).
183
 While the Act also requires that the defendant be “found” within the U.S. for 
purposes of establishing jurisdiction, this does not present an additional barrier 
to exercising jurisdiction.  When defendants are brought into the U.S. for the 
purpose of prosecution, the “being found in the U.S.” requirement is satisfied.  
This concern was addressed in United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 
1984), where the court held that jurisdiction was properly established under the 
Anti-Hijacking Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n), when the defendant was “found” 
within the U.S. as a result of his having been brought within the jurisdiction to 
stand trial for other charges.  Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089, 1092.  The same 
conclusion was reached in United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996), where the defendant was found within the U.S. as a result of extradition.
184
 If they were not participating, then they may not be subject to prosecution 
under this statute.
185
 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a), (b), and (e).  The Act is entitled “Acts of terrorism 
transcending national boundaries.”  The federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear suits brought pursuant to § 2332b.  18 U.S.C. § 2338.
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hijackings against U.S. armed forces,186 any Al Qaeda detainees 
may be subject to prosecution under this statute.  In addition, the 
Taliban regime, by supporting Al Qaeda, has conspired to commit 
such acts.187  Accordingly, members of the Taliban may also be 
subject to prosecution under § 2332b.
Section 2339B of Title 18 also explicitly applies 
extraterritorially to prosecutions for providing, attempting to 
provide, or conspiring to provide material support to designated 
terrorist organizations188 such as Al Qaeda.189  The federal courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear suits brought pursuant to 
§ 2339B.190  While this statute applies extraterritorially, the 
material support must be provided while the defendant was within 
the United States.  Therefore, this statute is not applicable to the 
detainees captured in Afghanistan.191
Lastly, the War Crimes Act of 1996 provides 
extraterritorial application for prosecution of war crimes 
committed against members of the U.S. armed forces and U.S. 
nationals.192  While no formal war has been declared, “war” has 
186 See notes 45-59 and 102-120, supra , and accompanying text.
187 See notes 23-44 and 91-101, supra, and accompanying text.
188
 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) and (d).  Material support means “currency or 
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, 
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or 
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, 
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A(b).
189 See Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a).  
190
 18 U.S.C. § 2338.
191
 It might be possible to prosecute the detainees for any support they provide to 
Al Qaeda while at Guantanamo Bay, which is U.S. territory.  However, it seems 
unlikely that they could possibly provide any such support while being held in a 
prisoner camp.  Also, if any detainee had previously traveled to the U.S. and 
provided “material support” to Al Qaeda while in the U.S., then such detainee 
could be prosecuted under § 2339B.  However, based on the known public 
information regarding the detainees, this is not the case.
192
 18 U.S.C. § 2441 provides that “[w]hoever, whether inside or outside the 
United States, commits a war crime” the victim of which is “a member of the 
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been defined to include an “armed conflict, whether or not war has 
been declared, between two or more nations; or … between 
military forces of any origin.”193  Importantly, President Bush 
declared that an international armed conflict was in existence 
shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon.194
The War Crimes Act of 1996 defines “war crimes” as  any 
conduct that is defined as “a grave breach in any of the 
international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any 
protocol to such convention to which the United States is a 
party.”195  The relevant “grave breaches” of the Geneva 
Convention include “willful killing” and “extensive destruction … 
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out 
unlawfully and wantonly” during an international armed 
conflict.196  Thus, any collateral damages, to persons or property, 
and any terrorism, perpetrated since the armed conflict began are 
considered war crimes.197
Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States” is subject 
to prosecution under this Act.  18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) and (b).
193
 18 U.S.C. § 2331(4) (1992).
194
 Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a):  “International terrorists, including 
members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and 
military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the 
United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires 
the use of the United States Armed Forces.”
195
 18 U.S.C. § 2441(c).
196
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), art. 
8(2)(a)(i) and (iv).  
197
 This begs the question: when did the armed conflict begin?  When the U.S. 
started bombing Afghanistan; when the U.S. declared its war against terrorism; 
when the U.S. ground troops landed in Afghanistan; on September 11, 2001; 
when Al Qaeda first bombed U.S. embassies in 1995; when Al Qaeda bombed 
the World Trade Center in 1993; or some other event?  Clearly, as evidenced by 
the Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a), the U.S. believes that Al Qaeda started 
the conflict:  “International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have 
carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and 
facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale 
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The Geneva Convention’s Additional Protocol I, which is 
applicable to international armed conflicts,198 and to which the 
U.S. is a party, includes as a war crime “the feigning of civilian, 
non-combatant status,” focusing on the obligation of combatants to 
distinguish themselves from the civilian population.199  Arguably, 
both the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees are guilty of this war 
crime as they do not wear distinguishable uniforms.200  However, 
there is an exception in Article 44 of Protocol I for “situations in 
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an 
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself.”201  It can be 
argued under the rule and the exception that the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda fighters are distinguishable because of their “distinctive 
turbans,” even though not distinguishable to U.S. armed forces.202
Based on the above analysis, there are several 
extraterritorial U.S. statutes that provide jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the criminal cases against the detainees.203  Both the Taliban and 
that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United 
States Armed Forces.”  
198
 Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International 
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and II to the 
Geneva Conventions, Aug. 15, 1977, [hereinafter “Protocol I”], U.N. Doc. 
A/32/144, 161 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).
199
 Protocol I, supra note 198, at art. 37.  See also FRITS KALSHOVEN, 
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 83 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 
1987).
200 See notes 23-59, supra, and accompanying text.
201 See KALSHOVEN, supra note 199, at 83.
202 See, e.g. Shanker & Seelye, supra note 43.
203
 In order to bolster the argument for extraterritorial application, the 
abovementioned statutes that provide explicit or implicit extraterritorial 
application can be compared with other similar statutes that do not apply 
extraterritorially.  For example, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, which provides 
a civil remedy, allows any U.S. national injured in his or her person or property 
by reason of an act of international terrorism to sue in federal district court for 
recovery of threefold the damages sustained.  18 U.S.C. § 2333.  See also Boim 
v. Auranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1003-04 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (ruling 
that court had subject matter jurisdiction over suit for damages when plaintiff’s 
son was killed in a terrorist shooting in Israel).  While the federal district courts 
have exclusive jurisdiction over such suits, 18 U.S.C. § 2338, the Act does not 
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Al Qaeda detainees can likely be tried under the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 1990 and 18 U.S.C. § 2332b.  They may also arguably be 
tried for acts in violation of the War Crimes Act of 1996.  
In addition to the above statutes, the U.S. Article III courts, 
pursuant to international law, have universal jurisdiction to try any 
detainee who participated or conspired to participate in an act of 
international terrorism.204  International terrorism is defined in U.S. 
law by statute enacted pursuant to Congress’ power to define and 
establish the punishment for “[o]ffenses against the Law of 
Nations.”205  International terrorism includes activities that 
provide even implicit extraterritorial application as there is no language 
addressing activities occurring outside the U.S.  “Any national injured in his or 
her person … by reason of any act of international terrorism … may sue 
therefore in any appropriate district court of the United States….”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333.  
Similarly, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which prohibits the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (“PLO”) from operating in the U.S., does not imply 
extraterritorial application.  22 U.S.C. § 5201-03.  Rather, it specifically states 
that the PLO “should not benefit from operating in the United States.”  
Likewise, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which prohibits material support to terrorists, 
provides that a “violation of this section may be prosecuted in any Federal 
judicial district in which the underlying offense was committed.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A(a).  Section 2339A differs from § 2339B in that the former deals solely 
with terrorists and the latter deals with organizations that have been designated
as terrorist organizations.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
204 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 404 (1987).  See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1980); Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. E. C. Commission, 
European Court of Justice, [1982] 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 264.  See also 
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 
1999, G.A. Res. 54/109 of Dec. 9, 1999; Measures to Eliminate International 
Terrorism, G.A. Res. A/52/165 of Dec. 15, 1997; International Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Doc. A/52/653 of Nov. 25, 1997; 
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving 
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Action, done at 
Montreal on Feb. 24, 1988.  These and other resolutions are available at the “UN 
Action Against Terrorism” website, at www.un.org/terrorism.
205 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  
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(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human 
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the 
United States or of any State, or that would be a 
criminal violation if committed within the 
jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
(B) appear to be intended –
(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian 
population; 
(ii) to influence the policy of a government 
by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by 
mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend 
national boundaries in terms of the means by which 
they are accomplished, the persons they appear 
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in 
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.206
The Al Qaeda agenda falls within this definition207 and is in 
violation of U.S. domestic law, as the various Anti-Terrorism 
Acts208 and the Military Order209 evidences.210  United States law 
206
 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (1992).  The definition of “domestic terrorism” is 
substantially similar with the exception that the acts occur “primarily within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”  18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).  
Notwithstanding these explicit definitions, there may be a potential international 
concern in that the international community has yet to agree on a definition for 
terrorism.  See Rohan Sullivan, Muslim Meeting Won’t Define Terror, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 3, 2002; Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of 
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion 
that are of International Significance, Oct. 8, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3949.  
207 See notes 45-59 and 102-120, supra , and accompanying text.
208
 The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-03 (1987); the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1990) (formerly the Anti-Terrorism 
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2331); the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2333 (1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (1996); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B (1996).
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sufficiently defines terrorism to allow for the prosecution of any Al 
Qaeda detainees in an Article III court.  
VI. Geographical, Practical, and Political Limitations in 
Both Article I and III Courts
While there are no constitutional geographical limitations 
on the use of Article I and III courts,211 other geographical 
limitations may inhibit the trial of a defendant in the U.S. for 
crimes committed overseas.212  For example, the subpoena power 
of the court might not reach important witnesses and the defendant 
might legitimately claim that lack of witnesses hampered him in 
presenting his defense.  In the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui, who 
has been charged in an Article III court in connection with the 
September 11 attacks, there were allegations of unfairness based 
on, inter alia, the absence of testimony from witnesses previously 
unable to be compelled to testify.213
Other practical geographical considerations include the 
location of the defendants, witnesses, and evidence.  Questions to
209
 Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a):  “International terrorists, including 
members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and 
military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the 
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consider include whether it makes sense to fly all the detainees to 
the U.S. to stand trial.  It would certainly be more convenient for 
the defendants if the U.S. established an Article I or III court at 
Guantanamo Bay.  All 600 to 800 detainees are present there and, 
because detainees may be testifying as witnesses in the trial of 
other detainees, such an overseas court would also be more 
convenient for at least some of the witnesses.  However, much of 
the evidence against the defendants is likely in Afghanistan.214
When looking to the location of the evidence, it seems more 
practical to establish an American court in Afghanistan.  This is 
likely not possible as there is still much social, political, and 
military unrest in Afghanistan.215  In light of the diplomatic 
warnings advising U.S. citizens not to visit Afghanistan,216 U.S. 
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court personnel, as well as the detainees themselves, might be in 
great danger in Afghanistan.  It therefore seems unlikely that 
Congress would choose to establish an American court there. 
There is also the political consideration that the U.S. wants 
to ensure that persons who attack U.S. armed forces or commit 
international terrorism are prosecuted.  To allow the detainees’ 
home countries to try them for their offenses would likely prove 
fatal to the conviction.  Afghanistan would not prosecute members 
of the Taliban, regardless of the war crimes they may have 
committed, as they were fighting with the country’s official army.  
This is evidenced by the release of hundreds of Taliban fighters in 
February 2002 by President Karzai of Afghanistan.217  In addition, 
to allow the country of citizenship of the members of Al Qaeda to 
try those members would also prove a political and diplomatic 
nightmare.  The detainees would likely become international 
bargaining chips in the U.S. war on terrorism.  Trying to reach a 
uniform punishment for the same crimes across the international 
community would likely be impossible.
VII. Constitutional Considerations Regarding the Use of 
Article I Courts in Place of Article III Courts
Thus far, this article has reached several conclusions.  First, 
both the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees are likely subject to 
Article I court-martial jurisdiction as POWs and combatants, 
respectively.  Second, they are also subject to Article III federal 
court jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions pursuant to several U.S. 
statutes.  Third, Al Qaeda is additionally subject to prosecution for 
acts of terrorism.  The question now becomes:  which court should 
try the detainees?  In order to answer this question, the 
constitutional basis for the use of the military justice system to try 
the detainees must be carefully considered and weighed against the 
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction of the U.S. federal court 
system, while still considering the above mentioned practical, 
geographical, and political limitations.  
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The policies underlying the judicial independence of 
Article III courts – to protect against biased adjudication, to protect 
the courts from political pressure exerted by the legislative and 
executive branches to decide the case in a politically desirable 
manner, and to protect the ability of the courts to strike down 
unlawful action taken by the political branches – are even more 
relevant when litigation involves foreign defendants.218  In fact, the 
need for an Article III court is particularly great when foreign 
defendants such as the detainees are accused of terrible crimes and 
the atmosphere is highly politicized.219  On the other hand, given 
the amount of negative media coverage in the U.S., it is unclear 
that a jury trial in an Article III court located in the U.S. would be 
more fair for the detainees.220
Even more essential, though, is that the framers designed 
Article III as a restraint on the federal government.221  When the 
framers structured the federal government to embody the 
separation of powers doctrine they were attempting to limit the 
intrusion by one branch into the affairs of another branch.222  They 
were conscious of the potential dangers of a strong central 
government and attempted to prevent the executive and legislative 
branches from exercising too much power by providing a system 
of checks and balances among the three branches.223  The 
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structural theory that guided the framers is upset if the political 
branches are allowed to create their own courts when there is an 
Article III court that has jurisdiction to hear a case, particularly 
when the threat of political influence on the tribunal is so great.224
Nonetheless, there are justifications for creating and 
utilizing an Article I court.  For example, Congress may create an 
Article I court out of a desire to keep the federal judiciary small 
and prestigious or because it prefers to create a court that has 
expertise in particular areas in order to better decide particular 
controversies.225  Neither of these justifications seems applicable to 
the criminal trials of the Al Qaeda detainees as no new Article III 
court is necessary to conduct the trials.  Also, Congress may prefer 
an Article I tribunal because the judges, who lack life tenure and 
salary protections, are less likely to be independent and are more 
likely to be influenced by political pressure.226  This justification 
may be applicable here, but it violates checks and balances and 
separation of powers.
In light of these constitutional doctrines, there are several 
factors to consider when determining if an Article I court may be 
used in place of an Article III court.  One factor is the origin and 
importance of the rights that the Article I court is adjudicating.227
The rights at issue in the cases against the detainees are life and 
liberty, clearly two of the most basic and valuable individual 
rights.  This suggests that the criminal cases should be heard in an 
Article III court because it provides more constitutional protection 
than an Article I court.  Also a factor is the extent to which the 
Article I court is exercising jurisdiction and powers normally 
vested only in Article III courts.228  The answer is unclear.  If the 
detainees are POWs, lawful combatants, or unlawful combatants 
violating the law of war, then jurisdiction in the military courts is 
proper and the Article III courts are not being deprived of their 
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usual jurisdiction.  On the other hand, if the detainees are civilians 
and/or terrorists and there is no “war,” then their criminal cases 
would normally be heard in an Article III court and giving 
jurisdiction to an Article I court would upset the balance of the 
carefully crafted constitution.
The ultimate consideration is a balancing test, with the 
benefits of utilizing an Article I court weighed against the 
disadvantages of an Article I court, particularly whether the Article 
I court undermines the doctrine of checks and balances.229  The 
benefits in having an Article I court try the detainees is a less 
public, less “circus-like” atmosphere because Article I courts need 
not be public and may be conducted on an expedited basis.  Also, 
because the evidentiary rules of admissibility will be different than 
in an Article III court,230 the trials are likely to be less time
consuming, which is important considering there are over 600 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay.  Of the disadvantages, the most 
prominent is that a highly politicized trial should not be tried by 
the political branches as the constitution was designed to allow the 
judicial branch to check and balance the political branches in 
political situations.  However, Article III courts do not always find 
it necessary to balance in such as manner, e.g. when they decline to 
hear an otherwise justiciable case because it is a political question 
that the political branches should handle.231
VIII. Conclusion:  A Solution
Approximately a year has passed since the Taliban soldiers 
and Al Qaeda operatives were detained and international pressure 
regarding their treatment and detention has waned.232  Most 
importantly, domestic pressure for swift retribution for the 
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September 11 attacks has faded.233  Accordingly, the U.S. 
administration is no longer in a hurry to prosecute the detainees as 
a prosecution will halt the ability to interview the detainees in 
order to obtain valuable information.234  When the U.S. is ready to 
prosecute the detainees, there are several possibilities.  One 
solution, however, is superior to the others.  In light of the 
constitutional considerations, recognized exceptions to Article III, 
and foreign policy, the Taliban detainees should be tried in an 
Article I court-martial and the Al Qaeda detainees should be tried 
in an Article III court.  This supports the U.S. war against terrorism 
by separating the Taliban armed forces from the Al Qaeda 
terrorists.235  It also provides a basis for desirable international 
reciprocity regarding any future trials of members of the U.S. 
armed forces.
This solution is not, however, without faults as the 
application of extraterritorial statutes in an Article III court may 
subject U.S. citizens to negative reciprocal treatment abroad, 
especially when armed forces in an international armed conflict are 
at issue.  The U.S. cannot hope to prosecute foreign acts committed 
against its citizens without subjecting U.S. citizens, including U.S. 
military personnel, to similar prosecutions from foreign countries.  
In order to avoid this unfavorable reciprocity, the Al Qaeda 
detainees could be tried by court-martial as unlawful combatants 
and for violating the law of war.  
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